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Abstract
In this paper, a secure and eﬃcient authentication and authorization architecture for IoT-based healthcare is developed. Security and
privacy of patients’ medical data are crucial for the acceptance and ubiquitous use of IoT in healthcare. Secure authentication and
authorization of a remote healthcare professional is the main focus of this work. Due to resource constraints of medical sensors,
it is infeasible to utilize conventional cryptography in IoT-based healthcare. In addition, gateways in existing IoTs focus only
on trivial tasks without alleviating the authentication and authorization challenges. In the presented architecture, authentication
and authorization of a remote end-user is done by distributed smart e-health gateways to unburden the medical sensors from
performing these tasks. The proposed architecture relies on the certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake protocol as it is the main IP
security solution for IoT. The proposed authentication and authorization architecture is tested by developing a prototype IoT-based
healthcare system. The prototype is built of a Pandaboard, a TI SmartRF06 board and WiSMotes. The CC2538 module integrated
into the TI board acts as a smart gateway and the WisMotes act as medical sensor nodes. The proposed architecture is more
secure than a state-of-the-art centralized delegation-based architecture because it uses a more secure key management scheme
between sensor nodes and the smart gateway. Furthermore, the impact of DoS attacks is reduced due to the distributed nature
of the architecture. Our performance evaluation results show that compared to the delegation-based architecture, the proposed
architecture reduces communication overhead by 26% and communication latency from the smart gateway to the end-user by 16%.
c© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
Peer-review under responsibility of the Conference Program Chairs.
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1. Introduction
Recent advances in information and communication technologies and embedded systems have given rise to a new
technology: Internet of Things (IoT)1. IoT enables people and objects in physical world as well as data and virtual
environments to interact with each other, hence realizing smart environments such as: smart transport systems, smart
cities, smart healthcare, and smart energy as part of a prosperous digital society. The rising cost of healthcare, and the
prevalence of chronic diseases around the world urgently demand the transformation of healthcare from a hospital-
centered system to a person-centered environment, with a focus on citizens’ disease management as well as their
wellbeing2. It has been predicted that in the following decades, the way healthcare is currently provided will be
transformed from hospital-centered, ﬁrst to hospital-home-balanced in 2020th, and then ultimately to home-centered
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in 2030th3. This essential transformation necessitates the fact that the convergence and overlap of the IoT architectures
and technologies for smart spaces and healthcare domains should be more actively considered2,4,5,6.
Security is a major concern wherever networks are deployed at large scales. IoT-based healthcare systems deal
with human-related data. Although collected from innocuous wearable sensors, such data is vulnerable to top pri-
vacy concerns7. In IoT-based healthcare applications, security and privacy are among major areas of concern as most
devices and their communications are wireless in nature8. Due to direct involvement of humans in IoT-based health-
care applications, providing robust and secure data communication among healthcare sensors, actuators, patients, and
caregivers are crucial. Misuse or privacy concerns may restrict people to utilize IoT-based healthcare applications.
Conventional security and protection mechanisms including existing cryptographic solutions, secure protocols, and
privacy assurance cannot be re-used due to resource constrains, security level requirements, and system architecture
of IoT-based healthcare systems9. To mitigate the aforementioned risks, strong network security infrastructures for a
short or long-range communication are needed. There are signiﬁcant security solutions to current wireless networks
which are not directly applicable to IoT-based healthcare applications due to the following challenges10: i) security
solutions must be resource-eﬃcient as medical sensor nodes have limited processing power, memory, and communi-
cation bandwidth. Thus, using conventional cryptography techniques that require heavy computations are infeasible,
and ii) medical sensor nodes can be easily lost or abducted as they are tiny in terms of size.
Recently, there have been eﬀorts in designing Smart e-Health Gateways for IoT-based healthcare applications2.
In most of IoT-based healthcare applications, especially in smart homes/hospitals, there exists a bridging point (i.e.,
gateway) between a sensor network and the Internet which often just performs basic functions such as translating
between the protocols utilized in the Internet and sensor networks. In a smart home/hospital, where the mobility
and location of patients are conﬁned to hospital facilities or buildings, gateways can play a key role. The stationary
nature of such gateways enables them with the exclusivity of being non-resource constrained in terms of power con-
sumption, memory, and communication bandwidth. This property can be exploited by outsourcing some burden of
resource-constrained medical sensors/actuators to be performed on smart e-health gateways. By taking responsibility
for handling some burdens of a sensor network and a remote health-care center, a smart e-health gateways can cope
with a number of challenges in ubiquitous healthcare systems such as security, scalability, and reliability.
In this paper, we present a secure and eﬃcient authentication and authorization architecture for IoT-based healthcare
using distributed smart e-health gateways called SEA. SEA exploits the aforementioned features of distributed smart e-
health gateways to outsource some burden of medical sensor nodes that enable those sensors to communicate securely
and eﬃciently beyond independent network domains. By providing the established connection context to the medical
sensor nodes, these devices no longer need to authenticate and authorize a remote healthcare center or a caregiver.
Thus, any malicious activity can be blocked before entering to a medical constrained domain. We employed DTLS
handshake protocol as it is the main IP security solution for the IoT. To the best of our knowledge, SEA is the
ﬁrst eﬀort in proposing a secure and eﬃcient authentication and authorization approach for IoT-based healthcare
applications using smart e-health gateways. We elaborate the proposed approach from the viewpoint of security as
well as performance analysis. To provide a proof of concept, we also demonstrate our prototype of a IoT-based
healthcare architecture using smart e-health gateway and discuss the design and implementation of our prototype.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, the related works and the motivation of this work
are discussed. Section 3 describes the proposed secure and eﬃcient authentication and authorization architecture for
IoT-Based healthcare systems. Demonstration of our proposed architecture and experimental results are provided and
discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work and Motivation
For the discussion of related work, we recognize two main research directions: (i) IoT-based Healthcare Security
and (ii) Smart Gateways.
2.1. IoT-based Healthcare Security
CodeBlue is one of the most popular healthcare research projects that has been developed at the Harvard sensor net-
work Lab11. In this approach, several medical sensors are placed on patients’ body. CodeBlue has been expected to be
deployed in in-hospital emergency care, stroke patient rehabilitation and disaster response. The authors of CodeBlue
admit the necessity of security for IoT-based medical applications. However, the security aspects of CodeBlue is still
pending or it is left as a future work. Lorincz et al. 12 suggest that Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)13 and TinySec14
are eﬃcient solutions to be used for key generation and symmetric encryption in the CodeBlue project, respectively.
But, so far their proposed solution has not been implemented yet. Kambourakis et al. discuss some attack models and
security threats concerning the CodeBlue project: denial-of-service attack, snooping attack, grey-hole attack, sybil
attack, and masquerading attacks15. To establish an interoperable network security between end-peers from indepen-
dent network domains, variants of conventional end-to-end security protocols have been recently proposed among
which Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) is one of the most relevant protocols17. In this regard, Hummen
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Fig. 1. Conventional Security Architecture 16
et al.16 present an implementation of a delegation architecture based on an oﬀ-path delegation server. As depicted in
Fig. 1, their proposed delegation-based architecture relies on a centralized delegation server. However, their proposed
architecture lacks scalability and reliability. More precisely, their architecture cannot be extended to be employed
for multi-domain infrastructures, e.g. large in-home/hospital domains. Also, their proposed architecture suﬀers from
a considerable network transmission overhead resulting to a long transmission latency. Moreover, if an adversary
performs a Denial of Service (DoS) attack or compromises the delegation server, a large quantity of stored security
context of a constrained domain can be retrieved. More precisely, in multi-domain networks, a DoS attack can disrupt
all the available constrained medical domains as the functionality of the IoT-based healthcare still depends on the
centralized delegation server.
2.2. Smart e-Health Gateway
There have been many eﬀorts in designing gateways for one or several speciﬁc applications and architectural layers.
Muller et al.4 present a gateway called SwissGate which handles and optimize the operation of sensor networks. They
transparently employ their proposed gateway on home automation applications. Shen et al.5 propose a prototype of a
smart 6LoWPAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks) border router that makes local decisions
of users health states based on a Hidden Markov Model. Finally, Rahmani et al.2 present a smart e-health gateway
called UT-GATE in order to bring intelligence into IoT-based ubiquitous healthcare systems. These gateways are
intelligent in the sense that they have been empowered to autonomously perform local data storage and processing, to
learn, and to make decision at the edge of the network (i.e., in a distributed fashion), thanks to the provided embedded
processing power and storage capabilities of the gateways. A smart gateways can rapidly provide preliminary results
and reduce the redundant remote communication to cloud servers by using data aggregation, embedded machine
learning, and compression techniques, thus oﬀering the basic services at the edge of the network. In this way, remote
cloud computers will just provide premium services which are often computationally intensive and require to access
to the central database.
As can be noticed from Fig. 2, in a smart home/hospital, gateway is in a unique position between the both
Body/Patient/Local Area Network (BAN/PAN/LAN) and Wide Area Network (WAN). Thus, this promising opportu-
nity can be exploited by diﬀerent means such as collecting health and context information from those networks and
providing diﬀerent services accordingly. As mentioned above, compared to the conventional gateways which often
just performs basic functions such as translating between the protocols used in the Internet and sensor networks, smart
e-health gateways are empowered with the property of being non-resource constrained in terms of processing power,
memory, power consumption, and communication bandwidth. Moreover, certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake that is
employed to authenticate and authorize remote end-users imposes signiﬁcant overheads to constrained medical sensor
nodes. These resource requirements specially barricade secure and eﬃcient communications among medical sensor
nodes and remote end-users. As a result, our proposal is motivated by the fact that in a smart hospital/home, the strate-
gic position and the distributed nature of smart e-health gateways can be exploited to handle the main computation
and communication overhead of medical sensor nodes deduced from end-user authentication and authorization.
3. Secure and Eﬃcient Authentication and Authorization (SEA) Architecture
The architecture of IoT-based healthcare monitoring system using smart e-health gateways in home/hospital do-
main(s) is shown in Fig. 2. In such a system, patient health-related information is recorded by body-worn or implanted
sensors, with which the patient is equipped for personal monitoring of multiple parameters. This health data can be
also supplemented with context information (e.g., date, time, location, and temperature) which enables to identify
unusual patterns and make more precise inferences about the situation. The proposed system architecture includes the
following main components: i) Medical Sensor Network (MSN), enabled by the ubiquitous identiﬁcation, sensing, and
communication capacity, bio-medical and context signals are captured from body/room which is used for treatment
and diagnosis of medical states. The signal is then transmitted to the gateway via wireless or wired communication
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Fig. 2. The Architecture of an IoT-based Healthcare Monitoring System Using Smart e-Health Gateways in Home/Hospital Domain(s)
protocols such as Serial, SPI, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi or IEEE 802.15.4. ii) Smart e-Health Gateway, which supports dif-
ferent communication protocols, acts as a touching point between the MSN and the local switch/Internet. It receives
data from diﬀerent sub-networks, performs protocol conversion, and provides other higher level services such as data
aggregation, ﬁltering and dimensionality reduction2. iii) Back-End System, the back-end of the system consists of
the remaining components, a local switch (in in-hospital domains), a cloud computing platform that includes broad-
casting, data warehouse and big data analytic servers, and hospital local database (DB) that periodically performs
data synchronization with the remote healthcare DB server at the cloud to continuously synchronize patients’ health
data over time. In cloud computing platform accessability to patients-related health data is classiﬁed as public data
(e.g., patients’ ID or blood type) and private data (e.g., DNA) based on their relevance. iv) Web clients as a graphical
user interface for ﬁnal visualization and apprehension. The collected health and context information represents a vital
source of big data for the statistical and epidemiological medical research (e.g., detecting approaching diseases).
Our proposed SEA architecture exploits distributed smart e-health gateways to perform authentication and autho-
rization of remote end-users securely and eﬃciently on behalf of medical sensors. As mentioned before, the main role
of a gateway in general is to support diﬀerent wireless protocols and inter-device communication. However, in the
area of IoT-based healthcare, the role of a gateway has been extended to provide additional services such as: acting
as local repository, to temporarily store sensors’ and users’ information, providing local processing of sensors’ data
and bringing intelligence by enhancing with data fusion, aggregation, and interpretation techniques. For example,
UT-GATE 2 is a smart e-health gateway which is composed of dual-core ARM Cortex-A9 cores with symmetric mul-
tiprocessing at up to 1.2GHz each. It supports up to 128GB memory and has been powered by Ubuntu Operating
System (OS). Likewise, Intel IoT Gateways6 which enable connectivity up to the cloud and enterprises and down to
the sensors, pre-process ﬁltering of selected data for delivery, local decision making, data encryption and software lock
down for security. Intel IoT Gateway includes choice of Intel processors: Intel Quark SoC X1000, Intel Quark SoC
X1020D, and Intel Atom processor E3826 and supports external SD memory. As shown in Fig. 1, conventional se-
curity architecture proposed for IP-based IoT relies on a centralized Delegation Server that can provide a constrained
device with necessary security contexts16. However, in this architecture, if an adversary performs a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack or compromises the delegation server, a large quantity of stored security context of a constrained domain
can be retrieved. More precisely, in multi-domain networks, a DoS attack on delegation server can disrupt all the
available constrained medical domains as the functionality of the IoT-based healthcare still depends on the centralized
delegation server. To fulﬁll the above challenges, we exploit the aforementioned features of the smart e-health gate-
ways to perform authentication and authorization more securely and eﬃciently using a distributed approach. In this
architecture, the major responsibility of the smart e-health gateway is to provide the constrained medical device with
essential security contexts to enable them to securely communicate with the remote end-user. To build the necessary
security context along with remote end-point, smart e-health gateway acts on behalf of medical constrained devices.
Afterward, the established security context is handed over to a constrained medical device.
Compared to typical gateways as well as delegation server, since smart e-health gateways has a local database, it can
temporarily store medical sensors’ information and provide local processing of medical sensors’ data, hence its role
can be authorized as an embedded server. By exploiting the above-mentioned features of smart e-health gateways, the
authentication and authorization task of a centralized delegation server can be broke down to be handled by distributed
smart e-health gateways. Hence, in each room/sub-domain of smart medical constrained domains (i.e., home, hospital,
and elderly house) authentication and authorization of remote end-points can be handled by an exclusive smart e-
health gateway. As a result, in a multi-domain smart home/hospital network if an adversary performs a DoS attack
or compromises one of the smart e-health gateways, only the associated medical constrained sub-domain can be
disrupted. In the proposed SEA architecture, ﬁrst, we intend to re-use available security protocols to implement
authentication and authorization among independent network domains. Second, we try to provide essential security
context to medical constrained devices that have limited hardware resources to securely communicate with remote
healthcare center. Our proposed SEA architecture focuses on a fact that the smart e-health gateway and the remote
end-user, have suﬃcient resources in order to perform various heavy-weight security protocols as well as certiﬁcate
validation eﬃciently. To provide an interconnection between a remote end-user (i.e., a remote healthcare center or
a caregiver) and a constrained medical device, a smart e-health gateway is introduced to build an IP-based security
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Fig. 3. Mutual Certiﬁcate-based DTLS Handshake Between End-user and Smart Gateway
protocol i.e., Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)17. DTLS handshake protocol is the main IP security solution
of IoT. A full handshake begins with a ClientHello message, that includes the security parameters for the connection
which is used later during the handshake to compute the pre-master secret key. Flight 3 contains additional cookie
from ClientHelloVerify. Flight 4 includes several messages and starts with ServerHello message which contains the
negotiated cipher suite for the current handshake and the smart gateway’s random value which is utilized later during
the handshake to compute the master secret key. The agreed cipher suite relies on supported cipher suites by end-
user. If the smart gateway and the end-user cannot agree on a common cipher suite, the handshake is canceled with
a HandshakeFailure alert message. The next message of ﬂight 4 is smart gateway’s Certiﬁcate message which holds
gateway’s certicate-chain. The ﬁrst certiﬁcate in the chain, includes the smart gateway’s public key which is created
using OpenSSL in version of 1.0.1.j. OpenSSL is an open source project for implementing SSL, TLS and various
cryptography libraries such as symmetric key, public key, and hash algorithms. It is commonly utilized for creating
and managing keys and certiﬁcates. Once the certiﬁcate is validated, end-user can extract smart gateway’s public key.
The CertiﬁcateRequest is only sent in a mutual handshake and includes the lists of smart gateway’s valid certiﬁcates.
The ServerKeyExchangemessage is only sent with speciﬁc cipher suites that need more parameters in order to compute
master secret key. cipher suite employed in this work is TLS ECDHE ECDS A WITH AES 128 CCM 8 SHA 256
indicates the use of elliptic cryptography particularly Elliptic Curve Diﬃe-Hellman (ECDH) and Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA). Furthermore, for encryption AES-based CCM with an IV of 8 bytes is used. With
this cipher suite, ServerKeyExchange message contains the ECDH public key of the smart gateway and the detail
of the associated elliptic curve. The ServerHelloDone message announces the end of ﬂight 4 messages. The ﬁrst
message of ﬂight 5, is the end-user’s certiﬁcate in case mutual authentication is run. ClientKeyExchange includes
additional parameters utilized to compute the master secret key. In this case, the ECDH public key of the smart
gateway is conveyed. CertiﬁcateVerify is a message which enables the end-user to prove to the smart gateway that
it carries the private key which corresponds to the public key contained in the certicate. Thus, it is only transmitted
in the mutual authentication. With the ChangeCipherSpec message, the end-user informs the smart gateway that
next messages will be encrypted using the agreed cipher suites and secret keys. The Finished message includes
the encrypted hash over all ﬂight messages which ensure that both peers have been performing handshake based on
unmodiﬁed ﬂight messages and the handshake is performed successfully. In ﬂight 6, the smart gateway responds with
its own ChangeCipherSpec and Finished messages. With the Finished messages both peers agree to send and receive
securely protected application information over this connection. Upon this connection setup, as shown in Fig. 4, the
remote end-point and the smart e-health gateway mutually authenticate each other. It is supposed that within the
certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake, from one hand, the smart e-health gateway authenticates (Auth-req.1) the remote
end-point through certicates. In this regard, similar to current web browsers, smart e-health gateways hold a pool of of
trusted certiﬁcate. On the other hand, the smart e-health gateway, either authenticates (Auth-req.2) to the remote end-
point through certiﬁcates within the DTLS handshake mechanism or based on an application-level password once the
handshake is terminated. The major goal of this work is to hand over the necessary security context, i.e. authorization
or remote end-users to constrained medical devices. Since in the proposed SEA architecture, the validation of the
certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake and the access right of the remote end-user is implemented by the smart e-health
gateway instead of the resource-constrained medical devices, any malicious activity can be blocked at the ﬁrst step of
the whole process. Thus, by building secure connections on behalf of the medical sensor, the smart e-health gateway
can securely and eﬃciently control with which remote end-user this medical sensor can communicate. Once the
mutual authentication between end-user and smart gateway is done successfully, end-user authorizes (Authz.) as a
trusted entity so that data query from user’s side is transmitted to the medical sensor node through the smart gateway.
To facilitate security and authorization of communication, it is also required that both entities, constrained medical
sensor and smart e-health gateway, mutually authenticate (Mut-auth.) one another within a local smart home/hospital
network domain. In SEA, this is done by performing a public key-based DTLS handshake between both entities.
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Fig. 4. The Proposed SEA Architecture Overview Using Distributed Smart e-Health Gateways
Although, symmetric key-based DTLS handshake protocol provides an eﬃcient alternative to public key-based DTLS
handshake, the symmetric key-based handshake needs secret keys to be pre-shared and readily available at both com-
munication end-points. Moreover, compared to the symmetric key-based DTLS handshake, obtaining secret points in
a public key-based handshake implies the computation of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem. Since solving the
discrete logarithm problem is as hard as integer factorization, this problem cannot be solved eﬀortlessly13. In this ar-
chitecture, for public key-based authentication and key agreement, ECC primitives, namely ECDSA13 and ECDH18,
are utilized which are more eﬃcient compared to their RSA19-based counterparts16. ECDSA provides the both au-
thentication and message integrity protection of an information and it is utilized with regards to the key exchange
protocol in DTLS handshake. ECDH is used to securely exchange secret information in an insecure communication.
In this regard, each of the peers, constrained medical sensor and smart e-health gateway, generate their own private
and public keys and exchange their generated pubic keys between themselves. Once mutual authentication and key
exchange protocol is done, it is required that both peers agree upon a common key. This shared common key can
be generated using an already agreed elliptic curve between the both peers. Using the shared common key, one peer
(i.e., constrained medical sensor) encrypts the gathered patients’ medical data applying the eﬃcient Advanced En-
cryption Standard (AES-CCM)20 algorithm and transmits the encrypted medical information (Enc./Dec.) to the smart
e-health gateway and vice versa. AES-CCM oﬀers conﬁdentiality, integrity, and authentication of payload which
compared to other commonly known symmetric encryption/decryption algorithms (e.g., RC5, and Triple-DES), it is
known as one of the most eﬃcient ones. Moreover, AES is supported by many constrained devices used for IoT
platforms. This make AES-CCM desirable encryption/decryption algorithm choice for constrained devices. The use
of distributed smart e-health gateways in this approach enable to address the previously mentioned challenges of the
conventional architecture. In the proposed SEA architecture: ﬁrst, a great part of the work (i.e., authentication and au-
thorization of a remote end-user or a remote healthcare center) is shifted to be performed by distributed smart e-health
gateways(s), thus, compared to the conventional architecture, network transmission overhead and latency is reduced.
Second, the privacy of patients, vital certiﬁcates, and key negotiation materials are eﬀectively protected. Third, the
IoT-based healthcare architecture becomes more scalable and reliable as the architecture is changed from centralized
to distributed fashion.
4. Implementation and Evaluation
In this section, ﬁrst, we describe the details of the proposed SEA implementation for the IoT-based healthcare using
smart e-health gateways. Second, we discuss the the evaluation of the proposed SEA implementation which is divided
into two main sections: (i) transmission overhead and (ii) latency. Finally, we provide a fair comparison between the
result of this work and the state-of-the-art delegation based authentication and authorization approach16.
4.1. Implementation
To Implement SEA, we setup a platform that consists of medical senor nodes, UT-GATE smart e-health gateway, re-
mote server, and end-users. In this platform the UT-GATE provides medical data collected from medical sensor nodes
to end-users through web browsers to their devices. UT-GATE is constructed from combination of a Pandaboard21
and Texas Instruments (TI) SmartRF06 board integrated with CC2538 module22. The Pandaboard is low-power, low-
cost single-board computer development platform based on TI OMAP4430 system-on-chip (SoC) following OMAP
architecture and fabricated using 45nm technology. OMAP4430 processor is composed of Cortex-A9 microprocessor
unit (MPU) subsystem including dual-core ARM cores with symmetric multiprocessing at up to 1.2GHz each. In UT-
Gate, 8GB external memory added to the Pandaboard and powered by Ubuntu OS which allows to control devices and
services such as local storage and notiﬁcation. To investigate the feasibility of the proposed SEA architecture, similar
to the existing studies on the security of medical sensor nodes, WiSMote23 platform which is a common resource-
limited sensor node in utilized2,7,8,10,12,16. Wismote is equipped with a 16MHz MSP430 micro-controller, an IEEE
802.15.4 CC2520 radio transceiver, 128KB of ROM, 16KB of RAM, and supports 20-bit addressing. We selected this
platform as it oﬀers enough processing power to implement public key-based DTLS handshake protocol.
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Table 1. Performance comparison with the state-of-the-art authentication and authorization approach for IoT.
Transmission-overhead (byte) LatencyGE (s) LatencyNG (s)
Hummen et al. 16 1609 6.08 ∼ 15
SEA approach (This work) 1190 5.001 ∼ 15
SEA approach improvements (%) 26 16 0
4.2. Security and Performance Analysis
For the evaluation of the proposed SEA approach, similar to the delegation-based architecture, we use the open
source tool OpenSSL to create elliptic curve public and private keys from the NIST P-256 (prime256v1) and X.509
certiﬁcates. X.509 certiﬁcates are the prevailing form of certiﬁcates and are employed in the certicate-based mode of
DTLS24. As the code-base of the proposed approach, we employed tinyDTLS 25, which is an open-source implemen-
tation of DTLS in symmetric key-based mode, to extend it with support of the public key-based as well as certiﬁcate-
based modes. For the public-key functions, we utilized the Relic-toolkit 26 which is an open source cryptography
library tailored for speciﬁc security levels with emphasis on eﬃciency and ﬂexibility. The MySQL database is set up
for static and non-static records. Static storage, which is managed by system administrators, includes white tables,
essential data required by DTLS handshake protocol and a user authentication mechanism, and consistent conﬁgura-
tions of diﬀerent services. White table encompassing the lists of sensor nodes identiﬁcation, is used as a premise in
pursuance of supporting the DTLS handshake between a smart e-health gateway and registered medical sensor nodes.
It also keeps track of communication of those sensor nodes. Essential data is used for DTLS handshake and end-user
authentication mechanism in the direction of guaranteeing a complete end-to-end security between a gateway and an
end-user. Non-static records storing up-to-date bio-signals that are synchronized between the Pandaboard database
and a cloud server database with the intention of maintaining large and long-term e-health data records. The cloud
server database is processed with the assistance of xSQL Lite which is the third party tool for data synchronization.
With respect to the cryptographic primitives and to make a fair comparison, we followed similar cipher suites (which
are current security recommendations for constrained network environments27) as employed in the state-of-the-art
authentication and authorization architecture for IP-based IoT26. In this regard, we utilize elliptic curve NIST-256 for
public-key operations, AES 128 CCM 8 (with an IV of 8 bytes) for symmetric-key operations, SHA256 for hashing
purposes. The presented results are based on averages over 100 runs and it is shown in Table 1.
4.2.1. Security Analysis
In delegation-based architecture16, if an attacker runs a DoS attack or compromises the delegation server, a large
quantity of stored security context of a constrained domain can be retrieved. Speciﬁcally, in multi-domain networks, a
DoS attack can disrupt all the available constrained medical domains as the functionality of the IoT-based healthcare
still depends on the centralized delegation server. Whereas, in this work, in a multi-domain smart home/hospital
network, if an adversary performs a DoS attack or compromises one of the smart e-health gateways, only the associated
medical sub-domain can be disrupted. Because, authentication and authorization task of a centralized delegation
server is broke down to be handled by distributed smart e-health gateways. Thus, compared to the delegation-based
architecture, the proposed SEA approach becomes more scalable and reliable as the architecture is changed from
centralized to distributed fashion. In addition, in delegation-based approach if an adversary compromises a constrained
sensor node, the master key can be accessed easily as it is pre-shared between the delegation server and the sensor
node during the bootstrapping process. However, in SEA approach, the shared master key is generated using an
agreed elliptic curve algorithm between the both sensor node and smart e-health gateway. Obtaining this master is not
easily possible as it implies the computation of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem which is as hard as integer
factorization.13. Based on the discussion above, the proposed SEA architecture has higher level of security compared
to the state-of-the-art delegation-based architecture.
4.2.2. Transmission Overhead
As discussed before, to perform the certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake, all 15 messages are needed to establish
a DTLS connection. When transmitted over size-constrained IEEE 802.15.4 radio links, these messages must ad-
ditionally be split into several packet fragments due to their extensive message size16. As Table 1. presents, we
compared the transmission overhead of the proposed SEA approach to the state-of-the-art architecture for a success-
ful certiﬁcate-based DTLS connection. In delegation-based architecture, the measured transmission overhead of the
certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake is 1609 bytes which cause in total 24 fragments for the transmission of all hand-
shake messages from the delegation server to the end-user16. In contrast, the proposed SEA architecture requires
transmission of 1190 bytes and it cause 18 fragments totally. As a result, the transmission overhead in the proposed
SEA architecture reduces by 26% compared to the delegation-based architecture.
4.2.3. Communication Latency
Latency is deﬁned as the time required from sending a request to conﬁrming the shared session key between
two peers. This metric is vital for time-critical applications such as IoT-based medical domains. To estimate the
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communication latency, the processing time which is spent from sensor node to the end-user (NE) is calculated. This
processing time deduced from the summation of communication latency from sensor node to smart gateway (NG) and
smart gateway to end-user which can be written as: LatencyNE = LatencyNG + LatencyGE . In this work, to compute the
communication latency from the UT-Gate to the end-user, a proxy server is adjoined to the network. Through the proxy
server, transmission latency between the end-user and the UT-Gate can be easily measured as proxy server listens
to requests transmitted from the end-user to the UT-Gate and vice versa without tampering or modifying them. To
compute the communication latency of GE, Fiddle2 proxy server which is a computer application is employed to track
requests and responses. Fiddle oﬀers a large number of services including security testing and HTTP/HTTPs traﬃc
recoding. According to our analysis, the proposed SEA approach achieves an almost equivalent NG processing time
to the delegation-based architecture16, which it takes up to 15S for the certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake. However,
the proposed SEA approach considerably reduces the processing time required for GE compared to the delegation-
based architecture. As shown in Table 1, in SEA, the processing time required for GE is about 5.001S whereas this
time increases to about 6.08S in the delegation-based architecture. Thus, regarding the latency from the gateway
to the end-user, the proposed SEA architecture obtains about 16% improvement compared to the delegation-based
architecture.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a secure and eﬃcient authentication and authorization architecture for IoT-based health-
care systems using distributed smart e-health gateways. Sensors used in medical applications are extremely resource-
constrained for which reason they cannot cope with cryptography techniques demanding heavy computations. To
alleviate this limitation, we proposed an architecture that employs distributed smart e-health gateways which perform
authentication and authorization on behalf of the medical sensors. This reduces the overhead imposed in the medical
sensors without compromising the security. The proposed architecture relied on the certiﬁcate-based DTLS handshake
protocol which is the main IP security solution for IoT. Our security analysis showed that the proposed architecture is
more secure than the centralized delegation based architecture. This is due to the distributed nature of the proposed
architecture as it has more resilience over DoS attacks and it uses a more secure key management technique. The
performance analysis revealed that our proposed authentication and authorization architecture reduces communica-
tion overhead by 26% and communication latency from the smart gateway to the end-user by 16%, compared to the
state-of-the-art architecture. Therefore, the presented architecture is a very promising solutions to provide scalable
and reliable end-to-end security for IoT-based healthcare systems.
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